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Rwanda is a small country in Equatorial Africa which has become known 
for the 1994 genocide that finished a century long development of polari-
zation of society in its socio-economic, political as well as cultural conse-
quences. The early roots of the genocide can be found already at the end 
of the 19th century when first under the German, and later during the Bel-
gian colonialism two “racial” entities were formed within one nation 
which had for centuries lived together sharing common history, language, 
cultural traits, religion, and socio-political organization and institutions.1
However, social scientists and historians until very recently could not 
agree on the initial phase of “antagonism” between Hutu and Tutsi, 
whether it was a matter of the Tutsi conquest long before the European 
colonialism came to Rwanda, or whether the politics of distinction was a 
matter of the European policy of divide and rule.2
In 1923, Rwanda was officially approved by the League of Nations 
as the Belgian mandated territory within Ruanda-Urundi. Already before 
this rather formal act, Belgium had professed to respect native institutions 
of both colonies and the Belgian administration had only to play the role 
of a guide following the principles of the indirect rule.3 In reality, Belgian 
influence on local political and social environment was greater than it 
might seem. Tutsi aristocracy was put into a place of indubitable superior 
“race” and rulers of the country with a supervision of their Belgian admin-
istrators. Hutu farmers and Twa hunters were destined to a role of second-
class citizens or subjects with no privileges. It was this polarization of 
society and the division between the rulers and the ruled, which had later 
imprinted the genocidal character to Rwanda and Burundi. Until the 
World War II, the Tutsi aristocracy enjoyed the fruits of superiority in 
terms of social privileges including distribution of wealth, access to educa-
tion, power and influence.4
1 C. BOONET, Le Ruanda-Urundi: Naissance et Organisation d’un Territoire à Mandat,
Dissertation, Groupe: Histoire, Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres, Université Libre de 
Bruxelles, 1977.; L. R. BÄCK, Traditional Rwanda: Deconsecrating a Sacred Kingdom,
in: H. J. M. CLAESSEN, P. SKALNÍK (Eds.), The Study of the State, The Hague 1981.
2 V. JEFREMOVAS, Brickyards to Graveyards. From Production to Genocide in Rwan-
da, Albany 2002, pp. 60–61.
3 J. CLEMENT, Le Ruanda-Urundi et la Tutelle belge, in: G. JACQUES et al. (Eds.), La 
colonisation belge. Une grande aventure, Nivelles, 2006, p. 332.
4 M. RWABAHUNGU, Au coeur des crises nationales au Rwanda et au Burundi. La 
lutte pour les ressources. Paris 2004, pp. 74–75.
-DQ=iKRĜtN
Some Notes on the Failed Decolonization of Rwanda
134
Retrospectivelly we may say that the polarization of society in 
Rwanda was caused by several interrelated factors. Belgian impact on
formation of ethnic, or racial in this case, identities is indubitable; growing 
demographic curve and overpopulation of Rwanda and Burundi is linked 
to it as well; mythologization and re-invention of collective identities done 
by the Catholic Church was allowed by its monopoly on education which 
was until 1940s mostly offered to Tutsuis while Hutu were allowed to at-
tend only to gain education (in smaller numbers) in worse schools.5 One 
of the notable Belgian representatives said in 1920s that the “Tutsis were 
destined to rule”,6 which openly approved the direction of Belgian admin-
istration giving privileges to one part of society while marginalizing the 
other.
Colonialism, the Church, and Race
The existence of the Rwandan monarchy in pre-colonial times, indigenous 
religion centered on a God (Imana) and the institution of a king (mwami)
led the Belgian colonial representatives to a presumption that the Tutsi 
kings were descendants of the Ethiopian Orthodox Christians who had 
migrated from Ethiopia to the Great Lakes region centuries ago. There, 
according to Belgians, they conquered local Bantu people.7 Below the 
king, several levels of chiefs existed including mutwale wa buttaka (chief 
of land), mutwale wa ingabo (chief of people), and mutwale wa igikingi
(chief of pastures). These three functions could be united in one person. 
Nevertheless, in times of unrest and uncertainty and in troubled re-
gionsthese functions were divided within king’s policy of “divide and 
rule”. The first category of chiefs could be administered also by Hutu 
chiefs due to their mode of livelihood based on agriculture.8 Although the 
chiefs were subordinated to the king and the level os control was quite 
high, the level of immediate control decreased with the distance of a re-
gion from the centre. Two pre-colonial institutions, which were later, used 
and abused by Belgians were uburetwa and ubuhake. The first was de fac-
to a forced labor established in the 19th century by Kigeri IV Rwabugiri 
and later during the Belgian administration became a part of a tax system 
imposed upon Hutu subjects. It was legitimized by a contribution to the 
national development. The latter was a clinetelist system involving two 
persons, a patron (shebuja), usually a Tutsi, and a client, vassal (garagu). 
5 T. LONGMAN, Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda, Cambridge 2010, p. 65.
6 P. RYCKMANS, Dominer pour servir, Bruxelles 1931, p. 26.
7 F. K. RUSAGARA, Resilience of a Nation. A History of the Military in Rwanda, Kigali 
2009, pp. 96–97.
8 G. PRUNIER, The Rwanda Crisis. History of a Genocide, London 1995, pp. 11–12.
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Both sides could enter the relationship freely so it was not comparable to 
slavery. Both uburetwa and ubuhake were institutionalized by Belgians as 
inseparable parts of a colonial system until it was abolished by law in 
1954.9 Belgians had shifted the dependency of one person to another per-
son to a level of dependency where one group of people was subjugated to 
another group of people.10 This was amplified by many other ideological 
aspects, which will be discussed below.
This was not however the only direct impact on social relations 
done by the Belgian authorities in Rwanda. General underestimation of the 
role of chiefs and their statuses as well as simplified generalization over 
many other social issues led to the situation in which Tutsis gained a status 
of a privileged and advantanged society while Hutus were put into a cate-
gory of labor force. In reality, pre-colonial Rwanda was not based on op-
posite relation between Hutus and Tutsis but rather on the relation be-
tween centre and periphery. While the posts of chiefs were reserved al-
most only for Tutsis, both Hutus and Tutsis formed the rest of population, 
subordinate citizens.11 Belgian colonialism thus helped to create un-
changeable identities of Hutu and Tutsi although it was not unusual in pre-
colonial period for Hutu farmers to accept the Tutsi identity in case of 
obtaining greater number of livestock. In other words, colonialism 
changed the social identity to ethnic identity. 
It was the Catholic Chuirch that played the leading role in ideolo-
gization and mythologization of ethnic identities as it preferred from the 
very beginning Tutsi elites above all other social elements. For Catholics, 
the beginnings were not as unchallenged as it might seem. The royal court 
was relatively reserved toward the White Fathers, which was the result of 
previous German lack of interest to the development of Christian missions 
in Ruanda-Urundi.12 The then king Musinga impersonated a barrier for the 
Catholic Chirch in its efforts to establish the Christian kingdom. In 1925, 
White Fathers blamed Musinga of being nostalgic for paganisnm or even 
Germna Protestantism. After a prolonged dissatisfaction with Musinga’s 
resistance, in 1930 Monsignor Léon Classe wrote an article in Belgium 
called Un Triste Sire. A year later, Musinga was deposed by vicegovernor 
Voisin and bishop of the Catholic Church as he was blamed of being an 
impediment to development. His son Rudahigwa, a successor to a throne, 
was baptized in 1943 and received names Charles (after cardinal Lavigerie,
9 RWABAHUNGU, p. 79.
10 L. de HEUSCH, Le Rwanda et la civilisation interlacustre, Bruxelles 1966, p. 152.
11 PRUNIER, p. 21.
12 JEFREMOVAS, pp. 66–67.
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Voisin and the Belgian Prince), Léon (as Classe), and Pierre (after general 
governor Ryckmans).13
Rudahigwa became Mutara III and formed probably the most im-
portant element connecting the Tutsi dominance with the power of Catho-
lic Church. Nevertheless, missionaries did not tend to cooperate with the 
Tutsis only in economic and political terms. Behind the White Fathers’ 
support to Mutara III Ruhadigwa there appeared several ideological rea-
sons, which quickly deepened in the 1930s and 1940s. These were formu-
lated already in 1927 by Léon Classe: “As for ourselves, from a religious 
point of view, since that is our perspective, we think from experience that 
the Tutsi element is for us better, more active, more committed, more ca-
pable of playing the role of inspiring the masses, and those who exercise 
the happiest directing influence on the masses…“14 It is not surprising that 
the Tutsi elites did not discouraged the Catholics form their prejudices and 
stereotypes based on unchangeable races and historically, god given supe-
riority of the Tutsi over the Hutu. In 1930s the Catholic Church already 
controlled education and curricula all over the country.  Already in 1929 
the Group Scolaire d’Astrida (today Butare) was established as one of the 
main educational institutions of the Tutsis. Generally, the Tutsis were des-
tined to gain better education than the Hutu who were meant to become 
workers and tax payers.15
The only opportunity for Hutu how to obtain higher education was 
to become a student of theology seminar in Kabgayi and Nyikibanda. Af-
ter graduation these students faced problems of reaching qualified jobs 
resulting in further frustration, which finally led to the social revolution in 
1959.16 Ruanda-Urundi remained after the World War II under the Belgian 
rule but this time not as a mandate of the League of Nations but the United 
Nations mandated territory. In 1949 Mutara III Rudahigwa visited Bel-
gium for the first time and consecrated his adhesion to the Catholic 
Church. In 1950, a ten-year plan for the development of Ruanda-Urundi 
was approved by the Belgian administration.17
In 1952, the Belgian administration initiated significant reforms, 
which counted with higher representation of the Hutu delegates in local 
and regional councils in order to reach a resolution on elimination of exist-
13 J.-P. CHRÉTIEN, The Great Lakes of Africa. Two Thousand Years of History, New 
York 2006, pp. 274–275.
14 LONGMAN, p. 62.
15 M. MAMDANI, When Victims Become Killers. Colonialism, Nativism, and the Geno-
cide in Rwanda, Oxford 2001, pp. 89–90.
16 PRUNIER, p. 33.
17 J.-P. HARROY, Rwanda. De la Feodalité á la Démocratie 1955–1962, Bruxelles 
1984, pp. 87–88.
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ing dominance of the Tutsi part of society. In 1953, election councils in-
cluded 7674 of Hutu (56.58 %), 5 442 of Tutsi (41.4 %) and 22 of Twa 
(0.22 %) representatives. The reforms calculated with future strengthening 
of indigenous social and political institutions, which would lead to further 
democratization of the country including higher percentage of indigenous 
representatives in election bodies.18 Yet in 1956, however, the Supreme 
Council was composed of only 1 Hutu and 31 Tutsi representatives.19
From the Hutu Manifesto to Independence
The Hutu Maniofesto, originally called Report on social aspect of racial 
native problem in Rwanda, published on 12th July 1957 divided the racial 
question into three levels, political monopoly, socio-economic monopoly, 
and cultural monopoly. The critique of the political monopoly was based 
on long-lasting superiority of the Tutsi kings and chiefs where the Hutu 
chiefs had played only minimal role rather being exceptional. Socio-
economic monopoly was stemming from an absolute dominance of the 
Tutsi people when it came to functions, privileges and advantages with 
direct economic benefits. Cultural monopoly was defined as a superiority 
of the Tutsi in terms of noble race whose cultural traits were regarded su-
preme. The Hutu Manifesto was aimed to promote and develop the Hutu 
part of Rwandan society in each of these levels in order to get rid of the 
Tutsi leadership.20 Belgians were aware of legitimate arguments and pow-
er the Hutu Manifesto had being simply a resonation of ambitions of frus-
trated and marginalized Hutu elites. Shortly after the Manifesto had been 
published, the Belgian administration began preparations on the land re-
form and other reforms including redefinitions of chieftaincy, labor, as 
well as mass education for the Hutu in Rwanda.21
In October 1957, representatives of the Hutu elites addressed a let-
ter to Mutara II Rudahigwa, based on the Hutu Manifesto, in which they 
appealed on fulfillment of several fundamental demands. These were 
mostly related to equal and rightful representation of all three groups (Hu-
tu, Tutsi, Twa) of people in Rwanda in the Supreme and regional coun-
18 Archives Africaines/Affaires Indigenes, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels – AA/AI 
(4376), no 58 Ministere des Colonies, Rapport de la Commission d’Enquete au Ruanda 
(janvier 1960), manuscript, p. 12.
19 Ibidem, manuscript, p. 14.
20 I. LINDEN, Church and Revolution in Rwanda, New York 1977, p. 249.
21 AA/AI (4370) no 10, Guvernér du Ruanda-Urundi Jean-Paul Harroy a ministre des 
colonies, Usumbura, 30 septembre 1957.
-DQ=iKRĜtN
Some Notes on the Failed Decolonization of Rwanda
138
cils.22 The Manifesto resulted from persuasion that the Hutu people were 
firstly colonized by the Tutsi and later by Europeans. Rhetorically, the 
authors of the Manifesto used the same ideological vocabulary as the 
Catholic Church. The Manifesto thus argued for elimination of dispropor-
tionality in which numerical minority ruled numerical majority, in this 
case the Hutu. Social, economic, and political reforms leading to promo-
tion of power and rights of the Hutu were the only way out.23 The Mani-
festo was not directed only to Belgian authorities but more improtantly to 
Belgium and United Nations as it aimed to point at insufficient conditions 
in which indigenous inhabitants of Rwanda had lived under twofold colo-
nization. Such appeal was necessary to understand as a part of general 
post-war emancipation and self-determination movement of the era of 
decolonization.24
One cannot think that the Belgian pro-reform shift was led by na-
ïve pro-Hutu commitment. Still it was necessary to keep caution in order 
to maintain order and prevent the country and people from chaos and un-
rest.25 The Tutsi elites refused to even discuss conflicts between clans and 
tribes (ubgoko) and stressed the fact that the Rwandese mwami was the 
ehad of all Rwandese people, not only Tutsi. The Supreme Council, which 
had met on 9th to 12th June 1958 in order to solve the Hutu-Tutsi problem 
even, stated that ethnic categories like Hutu and Tutsi were non-existent 
and thus there was not any ethnic problem.26 Crucial difference between 
the Hutu nationalism and the Tutsi nationalism lied in the way in which 
both perceived the roots of the colonial problem. While the Hutu called for 
elimination of the Tutsi colonialism first, the Tutsi pressed for an inde-
pendent Rwanda and thus to end the European colonialism. Under such 
circumstances polarizing the society and political elites within the country, 
Mwami Mutara III Rudahugwa, at the meeting of the Supreme Council, 
said towards the Hutu demands: “It is a damaging increasing noisy prop-
aganda spread by a small group acting under foreign influence with com-
munist ideas. Their intention is to divide the country. They would not suc-
ceed to divide a country whose national unity and secular political force 
organization has annihilated the most powerful attackers. The country is 
reunited to identify, cut down, eradicate, and burn that ill tree which is 
22 Ibidem, A sa majesté Mutara III Rudahigwa Mwami du Ruanda, Président du Conseil 
Supérieur du Pays Nyanza-Ruanda. Astrida, le 21 octobre 1957.
23 AA/AI (4370) no 10, H. Guillaume: Mission de Visite 1957 Expose du servise des 
A.I.M.O. (manusript, date unknown).
24 AA/AI (4376), no 64, Temps Nouveaux 21. 11. 1958, Gaspard Cyimana: Problémes 
sociaux et ethniques au Ruanda.
25 AA/AI (4370) no 10, A. Buisseret á J. Paulus, le 17 octobre 1957, Bruxelles
26 LINDEN, p. 255.
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infecting its life.“27 At the same time, Mwami stressed there was not a 
racial problem but only a social one as he added that “Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa, all of them are Banyarwanda.“28 Such a question was not unique at
that time and Mwami only followed some of the former Tutsi intellectual 
leaders who had asked themelves, “Who is muhutu, who is mututsi, who is 
mutwa? On which principle we divide them so? On the basis of physical, 
social, or economic criteria?”29 Each side of population had its own an-
swers and point of view. 
Despite the Belgian control over social and political issues, the au-
thorities were aware of necessity to implement the reforms. Anyway, in 
official documents, the problem of Hutuization of the Tutsi system was 
never mentioned, as the principle of Africanization of Rwanda was the 
primary factor of the native development and democratization. Mandate 
administration and above all the direct impact of the Church became inevi-
table obstructions to development. The only possible scenario for the 
Rwandan elites how to reach a positive development in their country could 
be the Africanization of political system. In spite of scuh proclamations 
and plans, Belgians did not allow a complete reghime change, as they 
tended to keep a grip on power in the late 1950s. The word “independ-
ence” was not a part of colonial vocabulary of that time. Among some 
Belgian officials, plans for a decolonization of Ruanda-Urundi and Afri-
canization of its political system acted like a treason of Belgium that had 
invested so much for the development of the country and its functional 
apparatus.30
In 1959, certain Lazare Ndazaro addressed a letter to the royal in-
spector van Hove in which he described the then situation in Rwanda in-
cluding the problems of the Hutu Social Movement. Within the nationalist 
camp supporting the royal tradition, names like A. Kagame, L. Gasore and 
J. Mulenzi were included. Alexis Kagame was a doctor of philosophy and 
members of the Ruanda-Urundi Governments’ Advisory Council. During 
the reign of Mutara III Kagame became one of the most influential histori-
ans who wrote Rwandese history according to European perceptions re-
garding the Hutu-Tutsi relations. Vicar of the Nyundi Vicariat, L. Gasore, 
wrote about racial discrimination of the European regime, about its injus-
tices and necessity to Africanize the state administration, for instance by 
27 MAMDANI, pp. 118–119.
28 AA/AI (4376), no 58 Ministere des Colonies, Rapport de la Commission d’Enquete au 
Ruanda (janvier 1960), manuscript, p. 18.
29 AA/AI (4376), no 64, Témoignage Chrétien 6. 9. 1958, Mgr Bigirumwami: Les pro-
blemes sociaux et ethniques au Ruanda. 
30 AA/AI (4370), no 14, H. Guillaume, Le Chef du Service des affaires indigenes, Usum-
bura, le mai 13 1958. No 2210/91 C. Note pour Monsieur Le Vice-Gouverneur General.
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equation of salaries of European and Rwandese staff. The third prominent, 
Janvier Mulenzi, was a doctor of political sciences and diplomacy. Ac-
cording to Lazaro Ndazare, this group of nationalists and intellectuals 
sought to establish not a true democracy, but rather an oligarchy for which 
they searched support even in neighboring Uganda.31 The Hutu emancipa-
tion was, on the other hand, represented by Grégoire Kayibanda and Juvé-
nal Habyarimana, who then became the first two presidents of independent 
“Hutu” Rwanda. Both of them belonged among nine Hutu intellectuals 
who formulated the Hutu Manifesto. Already in 1957, Grégoire Kayiban-
da founded together with Jospeh Gitera and Balthasar Bicamumpaka the 
Hutu Social Movement. The more visible the Hutu emancipation move-
ment was, the more intense was the refusal of the Tusti elites who simply 
rejected the Hutu demands by pointing at “historically approved” Hamitic 
myth concerning their racial superiority.
The Hutu Social Movement was founded in June 1957 in Kagbayi 
for the purpose of democratization of Rwandese institutions and judicial 
system. Neverthelss, in its beginnings the movement was not active too 
much since its founders had not have neither enough means for cam-
paigns, nor time to lead propaganda as its founder, G. Kayibanda, spent a 
year in Belgium. His stay in Europe caused some delay in propagation of 
basic ideas of the movement.32 A very tense situation and ethno-political 
polarization of the society was accelerated by sudden death of Mutara III 
Rudahigwa on 25th July 1959 in Bujumbura. His death showed how deep 
the rupture between the Hutu and Tutsi part of Rwandese society was. 
Moreover, it disclosed severe tensions even within both camps. After 
Mwami’s death, the Supreme Council did not waste time with the election 
of his successor and on its meeting which had taken part shortly after Mu-
tara’s funeral, Jean-Baptiste Ndahundurwa, a son of the former Mwami 
Musinga and a step-brother of Mutara III, was elected Mwami with the 
name Kigeri V.33 Such a quick action was by Belgian authorities, Hutu 
elites and the Catholic Church considered a coup d’état and caused many 
negatiove reactions. Although Kigeri V seemed to Ruanda-Urundi vice-
governor Jean-Paul Harroy as an appropriate candidate, the speed with 
which he was inaugurated made him feel puzzled, as it was not a result of 
general consensus, especially in such a tense period of time.34 Having this 
situation done, representatives of the Hutu political party APROSOMA 
31 AA/AI (4370), no 16, Lazare Ndazaro a inspecteur royal Van Hove, Bruxelles, le 15 
janvier 1959.
32 AA/AI (4376), no 58 Ministere des Colonies, Rapport de la Commission d’Enquete au 
Ruanda (janvier 1960), manuscript, p. 15.
33 Ibidem, manuscript, p. 27.
34 HARROY, pp. 262–272.
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(see below) sent a letter to vocegovernor Jean-Paul Harroy in which they 
touched basic problems of fundamental royal symbols of Rwanda monar-
chy. These were, according to authors, a proof of the Tutsi superiority amd 
thus needed to be revoked and substituted by new symbols. The most cru-
cial one was the royal drum Karinga considered an emblem of the king-
dom and the Nyiginya dynasty. In order to create equal society where 
symbols of eacxh groupd would be valued properly, APROSOMA sug-
gested recognizing new symbols of the state, each being a characteristic 
element of each society: a farmer’s hoe (Hutu), stick of a pastoralist (Tut-
si) and a spear of hunter (Twa). At the same time, they demanded higher 
representation of Hutu and Twa chiefs in so far unseated or vacant posts.35
This initiative was one of many which marked the social revolution that 
affected Rwanda at the end of 1959.
In autumn 1959, new political parties came to existence in Rwan-
da. Their appearance only corresponded with already existing polarization 
of society into two blocks, each divided into moderate and radical current. 
Already in 1957, the APROSOMA (L’Association pour la Promotion So-
ciale de la Masse) party was created. Despite being regarded as Hutu par-
ty, it program was supposed to address masses irrespective of ethnic affili-
ation. The case of MDR-PAREMHUTU (Mouvement Démocratique Pop-
ulaire/Parti du Mouvement et de l’Emancipation Hutu), formed in No-
vember 1959 on the basis of the Hutu Social Movement, was different as it 
spoke directly to Hutu people even though it proclaimed democratization 
of existing institutions.36 The program of PARMEHUTU was based on a 
very radical Hutu nationalism stemming from the ideology of the Hutu 
Manifesto. In words of Jospeh Habyarimana, the primary goal of Belgians 
should have been liberation of Rwandese people of slavery and racism, 
which was created under the shelter of Rwandan kingdom and embodied 
in the person of Mwami. Destruction of the kingdom and elimination of 
the Tutsi colonialism was to be an introduction to general decolonization 
and democratization, according to Habyarimana.37
In the Tutsi camp, two political parties were formed in 1959. 
UNAR (L’Union nationale ruandaise) was founded on 3rd September 
1959 and it declared its support to preservation of monarchy. Among 
its founders, François Rukeba, merchant from Kigali, Michel Kayihura, 
a chief of Bugoyi, Pierre Mungalurire, chief of Bwanacyambwe, 
35 AA/AI (4376), no 64, Comité de l’APROSOMA Parti Social Hutu – Ishyaka 
ly’Abahutu, Astrida, le 6 aout 1959. A letter to viceguverneur du Ruanda-Urundi in 
Usumbura (J. P. Harroy).
36 MAMDANI, p. 121.
37 AA/AI (4376), no 64, Ishyaka Ly’Abahutu, Joseph Habyiarimana Gitera á le ministre 
du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi, Astrida, le 17 mars 1959.
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Chrysostome Rwangombwa, chief of Ndorwa could be found. Repre-
sentatives of UNAR published the so-called Manifeste du Parti poli-
tique Abashyirahamwe B’Urwanda, in which they called for unity of all 
Rwandese people (Banyarwanda) with a common aim being a real de-
velopment of Rwanda in all areas and at all levels.38 Despite avoding 
ethnic categories such as Hutu and Tutsi, it was apparent that the pro-
gram of UNAR proposed the maintenance of the existing Tutsi aristoc-
racy and they presented themselves as defenders of Mwami.39 For its 
nationalist rhetoric, UNAR did not hesitate to cooperate with various 
different foreign subjects including the Congolese National Movement 
of Patrice Lumumba, People’s Republic of China and other Communist 
countries which led Monsignor Perraudin to blame them for supporting 
anti-Catholic, Communist and islamist tendencies,40 most probably be-
cause many of its members came from the so-called Swahili quarters 
inhabited mainly by Muslims.
On 14th September 1959, the RADER (Rassemblement Dé-
mocratique Ruandais) party was officially established in order to 
“reach social, economic and cultural order, based on an authentic de-
mocracy in harmonious environment of relations of various groups of 
Rwandan people.”41 The party was founded by Prosper Bwanakweri, a 
chief who spoke for general elections of all chiefs, sub-chiefs and other 
administartors. Moreover, the RADER party as the first one came with 
a concrete schedule of decolonization as they propsed a formation of 
internal autonomy in 1964 and indepednecne of Rwanda in 1968. 
Among other dignitaries of the RADER party we may find vicepresi-
dents Pierre Mugunga and Alexis Karekezi, with abovementioned Laz-
are Ndazaro as a treasurer.42 On the other hand, the RADER party had 
only a minimal influence on decolonization process in Rwanda. Most 
probably because of it Manifesto from 1st October 1959 in which its 
leaders declared their support for a complete evangelization of Rwanda 
and preservation of friendship with Belgium.43 This, of course, was 
perceived by both nationalists and Hutu radicals as an unacceptable 
provocation. Between UNAR and both Hutu parties many violent 
clashes occurred already in 1959 when, for instance, on 20th September 
38 AA/AI (4376), no 58 Ministere des Colonies, Rapport de la Commission d’Enquete au 
Ruanda (janvier 1960), manuscript, p. 29.
39 Ibidem, manuscript, pp. 27–30.
40 J.-P. KIMONYO, Rwanda. Un génocide populaire, Paris 2008, p. 45.
41 AA/AI (4376), no 58 Ministere des Colonies, Rapport de la Commission d’Enquete au 
Ruanda (janvier 1960), manuscript, p. 35.
42 Ibidem.
43 Ibidem, manuscript, p. 38.
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1959, a meeting of UNAR took place in Astrida, a seat of APROSOMA 
which reacted by organizing a counter-demonstration.44
Activities of militants supporting UNAR became a matter of in-
terest of the Catholic Church as at the end of September 1959 Mon-
signor Perraudin and Monsignor Bigirumwami sent a letter to Catholic 
priests, in which they admonished them to be cautious when it came to 
UNAR proponents and potential Communist and Islamic influences. At 
the end of October 1959 the Belgian administration summarized the 
situation in Rwanda in the following points: a) UNAR followers con-
tinue in intimidatory campaign against their enemies hoping they gain 
the majority of votes in the following elections; b) leaders of other po-
litical parties and most of all lives of the Hutu leaders are endangered; 
c) sympathies of the Belgian administration go to the masses, attacks 
done by UNAR members are inacceptable.45 Right at the beginning of 
November, an incident occurred in Byiamna in the Gitarama region 
with the Hutu predominance, in which a group of eight youngsters at-
tacked one of the local chiefs, Dominique Mbonyomutwa, after he was 
getting home from the mass. Dominique Mbonyomutwa, very popular 
in his region, was one of the lesser Hutu chiefs in Rwanda and he acted 
simultaneously as a spokeperson of the Hutu movement. Death and 
violence committed on him caused a wave of unrest all over the coun-
try. The same day, a treasurer of PARMEHUTU, Joseph Cibomana, 
was beaten in the “Swahili” quarter in Gitarama. This was considered 
another attack done by UNAR militias.46 Revenge did not wait too long 
and the Hutu militants began to victimize local Tutsi civilians, burning 
their homes, killing and beating. Soon after, violence spread all over 
Rwanda and the UN mission sent to Rwanda at the beginning of 1960 
estimated the number of dead at around two hundred.47
The Belgian administration directly contributed to the Hutu so-
cial revolution by setting no restrictions and limitations to it, not men-
tioning the fact that they directly called for advatageing of the “Hutu 
element”. Belgians imposed a state of emergency and Colonel Guy Lo-
giest became a primary actor of the Hutu revolution when he stated that 
the Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs were responsible for the public unrest. 
Under such conditions he began to substitute the Tutsi chiefs by the 
Hutu chiefs resulting in a final phase of the social revolution.48 Mean-
while, violence forced thousands of the Tutsi civilians to take refuge in 
44 Ibidem, manuscript, p. 36.
45 Ibidem, manuscript, p. 51.
46 Ibidem, manuscript, p. 53.
47 KIMONYO, p. 48.
48 MAMDANI, p. 124.
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neighboring Uganda, in April 1960 there were already 22 thousand of 
Tutsi refugees. The PARMEHUTU party which viewed itself as the 
leading Hutu power called for an exodus of the Tutsi people to the 
homeland of their fathers somewhere in Abyssinia (Ethiopia), or to re-
turn in case they would respect the real democracy, meaning the rule of 
the Hutu.49 The Hutu revolution did not take place without any re-
sponse by the Tutsi aristocracy, at it sneginnings, many proponents the 
APROSOMA party were put in prison or physically removed.50 Mwami 
condemned all atrocities done by both sides by saying that he was 
“Mwami of all people of Rwanda without distinction and without limi-
tation” and added that the one who would cross the law of Rwanda, 
would be regarded as an enemy of the state.51
Based on the Belgian reports, it is apparent that the authorities 
were suspicious of UNAR’s efforts to maintain monarchy even though 
its dismantling was not a part of Belgians’ plans. At the same time, 
Belgians expressed understanding for activities of the APROSOMA 
party, which had to defend itself against UNAR’s attacks.52 Belgium, 
however, did not tend to fan hatred although its representatives were 
probably not fully aware of the impact of their policy of hutuization. 
Still, it was Belgium who appealed on both sides to keep the unity of 
the Rwanan nation. Chieftainship had to be, according to Belgian au-
thorities, restricted only to administrative pruposes and not political, 
and were aimed to play crucial roles in the development of local com-
munities.53
Conclusion
Surprisingly dramatic development in Rwanda led several proponents 
and defenders of integrity of Francophone Africa to anxiety about pos-
sible incorporation of Rwanda to Tanganyika which had been proposed 
by the British. A visit of Prosper Bwanakweli and Michel Kayihura in 
Lodnon in January 1961 had to identify possibilities to create greater 
federation of East African countries including Tanganyika, Kenya, 
Uganda, and Zanzibar. Belgians and French were afraid of potential 
49 KIMONYO, p. 49.
50 AA/AI (4376), no 58 Ministere des Colonies, Rapport de la Commission d’Enquete au 
Ruanda (janvier 1960), manuscript, p. 63–64.
51 Ibidem, manuscript, p. 85.
52 AA/AI (4376), no 63, J. M. Paulus, Note pour Monsieur le Ministre (Ministere du 
Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi), Bruxelles, le 16 octobre 1959.
53 AA/AI (4376), no 63, Déclaration gouvernementalle au sujet du Ruanda-Urundi, 10 
Novembre 1959.
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admission of Rwanda and Burundi to Commonwealthu, 54 which, as 
history has shown, finally occurred in the case of Rwanda after the 
genocide of 1994. On 28th January 1961, three thousand one hundred 
and twenty six representatives of the Hutu power gathered in Gitarama 
with other approximately twenty five thousand people waiting to hear 
results of this meeting, which entered history as the coup d’état from 
Gitarama. This event abolished monarchy in Rwanda and established a 
republic with president Mbonyumutwa and a government led by Prime 
Minister Grégoire Kayibanda. A UN Comission reacted on this coup 
with the following words: “Racial dictatorship of one party was estab-
lished in Rwanda, and the development of last eighteen months leaned 
on transition from one type of oppressive regime to another. Extremism 
is awarded and there is a danger that the [Tutsi] minority will face de-
fencelessly the abuse of power.”55
Foundation of independent Rwanda in 1962, victory of the Hutu 
political parties in autumn of 1961, and ambivalent attitude of the Bel-
gian administration toward increasing tensions presented the first major 
threat to the cohabitation of the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. Tens of 
thousand of Tutsis were forced to leave the country especially to neigh-
boring Uganda, which proved to be decisive for the 1994 genocide. 
Appalling presumptions of several representatives of Francophonia 
about Rwandese identity has been fulfilled. Roots of this situation can 
be found already in the era of colonialism and failed decolonization of 
Rwanda, which Belgians did not manage properly.
Abstract
The study addresses some important issues concerning the decoloniza-
tion of Rwanda as reflected mostly in Belgian archival documents. Its 
main aim is to analyze the polarizing ethno-political atmosphere which 
resulted from completely failed policy of “racial” division of natives in 
Rwanda into fixed categories of “Hutu” and “Tutsi”. It deals with the 
process of artificial ethnic categorization and its materialization in the 
political struggle in the last years of Belgian colonial rule which were, 
retrospectively, probably the most crucial and turbulent in Rwandan 
modern history, especially when it comes to the genocide in 1994. 
Proclamation of Rwandan independence in 1962, victory of the Hutu 
political parties in autumn of 1961, and ambivalent attitude of the Bel-
gian administration toward increasing tensions presented the first major 
threat to the cohabitation of the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, which still 
54 AA/AI (4376), no 60, Temps Nouuveaux d’Afrique, 15 januar 1961.
55 KIMONYO, p. 51.
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remains one of the most tangible examples of the negative effects of the 
European colonialism, and the quick, unprepared, chaotic, and desper-
ately underestimated decolonization which, in many other cases, led to 
deep political crises in Africa.
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